This paper studies how the organizational structure–whether decisions are made at headquarters or regional divisions–of multi-region firms influences their expectations formation and price-setting behavior when paying attention to shocks is costly. To do so, I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with multi-region, rationally inattentive firms in which firms collect information on both aggregate and region-specific shocks. When decisions are made at headquarters, firms allocate attention between overall demand and regional demand differences, ignoring the latter as geographic dispersion increases. In contrast, when decisions are decentralized, regional divisions focus solely on their own demand. I calibrate the model to U.S. Federal Reserve districts, matching the average within-firm across-regions relative price dispersion in NielsenIQ scanner data. In the calibrated model, monetary shocks have real effects that are six times larger under regional decision-making compared to headquarters, and region-specific shocks spill over to other regions when decisions are centralized. Empirically, scanner data reveals that, even after accounting for distance, product-level relative price dispersion between regions is smaller within the same retail chain than across different chains, a result qualitatively replicated by the model.

Presented at: Federal Reserve Board (2024), Midwest Macroeconomics Meeting (Fall 2023), Southern Economic Association Meeting (2024)*, Texas Macro Job Candidates Workshop (2024) (* denotes scheduled)

Presented at: American Economic Association Meeting (2025)*, Midwest Macroeconomics Meeting (Fall 2024), NBER Inflation in the COVID Era and Beyond (Spring 2024) (* denotes scheduled)